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I.  Introduction
It is an honor for me to be asked to present the closing address at this
conference, which celebrates 20 years of achievement by those involved in
CEMA’s research and teaching activities.  Starting from a tabula rasa, CEMA
has become a leading contributor in both these dimensions, and has solidified
its position in the vanguard of the great campaign to bring good economics
to Latin America
Many of you are too young to remember, but it was not too long ago that
the policies pursued by many governments in Latin America, and the courses
taught in most universities across the region, reflected more bad economics
than good.  I and others of my generation were very fortunate in being able
to witness major transformations, both in the conduct of economic policy
and in the understanding and teaching of the discipline of economics.  A
goodly number of those present here today, and an even greater number of
their friends and colleagues from all over the region, played important
personal roles in both of these great transformations.
Even as a graduate student, I already carried the strong conviction that
we economists, the profession as a whole, had a great mission —  to help
harness the concepts and ideas of our discipline so as to improve the economic
lives of our fellow citizens in our countries and our fellow men across the
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world.  The experiences just referred to only served to strengthen and solidify
this conviction — they turned the acolyte of graduate school into a seriously
dedicated missionary who has spent most of his professional efforts in the
search for better economic policies and in trying to better prepare the
profession itself for carrying on this search.  How did the real-world
experiences manage to produce this effect?  Simply by convincing me, totally
and beyond any possibility of doubt, that bad policies really can bring a
nation’s economy to ruin, where it is likely to stay until good economic
policies enter as a vital part of any successful rescue plan.
But to say that bad economic policies are capable of bringing on disaster
does not mean that all disasters stem from bad policies.  Similarly, not all
economic booms and bonanzas are the result of simply instituting good
policies.  Quite the contrary, forces and shocks that are largely beyond the
control of policymakers sometimes far outweigh the force that they can exert.
An apt analogy is piloting a small boat on an ocean that is sometimes placid,
other times difficult, but quite navigable, and still other times tempestuous
and stormy, beset by hurricane winds and monstrous waves.  The tasks of
piloting are simple in the first case, somewhat demanding in the second, and
awesomely daunting in the third.  Good pilots are welcome in all cases, but
their expert contribution to a safe journey grows exponentially as nature’s
fury mounts.  Another analogy that I have used in the past compares the
economic system to the human body.  Those who keep themselves in good
shape may not escape an epidemic, but they are likely to suffer less if they
are struck with it, and to rebound more quickly when it is over.
Economists have to deal not only with external forces but also with the
complex interactions of a country’s political processes.  Economic technocrats
may be able to structure a tax reform here, a new social security law there, or
a modified exchange rate regime somewhere else, but they really never have
the luxury of a clean slate on which to set up, in full flower as it were, their
complete preferred economic policy framework.  In short, even the best
economic technocrats, even when they have the most power and authority,
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are unable to dictate the entire structure of economic policy.  They can
influence but not determine the pace and shape of reform.
The analogy is very apt between the whole structure of a nation’s economic
policy at any point in time and a patchwork quilt that has been built up,
patch by patch, over a great many years.  Each new chief executive, and
each new finance minister inherits the patchwork quilt put together by their
predecessors.  Typically it has many flaws, even internal inconsistencies.
Like it or not, each new administration will end up adding its own new patches
to this quilt.  The question is, do they make it better or worse?  Do they add
new flaws and inconsistencies, or do they get rid of old ones?  Do they add
to or subtract from the strength, utility, and aesthetic integrity of the quilt?
These are the questions that economic historians will ask as they try to assess
the contributions of different presidents, ministers and other protagonists.
Yet even these leaders do not determine their own fate.  Moments of
crisis open up opportunities, both for good and for ill, because people are
more willing to make sacrifices and take risks in the hope of surmounting
the crisis.  It is thus no accident that the waves of modernization and
liberalization in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and many
other countries were concentrated in periods of crisis.  Later, when the crisis
was past, additional steps in the reform process came slower and with more
difficulty, in the face of popular indifference, bureaucratic inertia and political
resistance and maneuvering.
So what about the lower-level technocrats, the economists who form part
of the standing bureaucracy that performs the day-to-day tasks of
governments?  These people rarely have the chance to perform glorious feats.
Theirs is a continuing struggle to keep the good parts of the economic policy
framework from being eroded, to prevent the creeping growth of the bad
parts, and to bring good economics to bear on any new decisions they have
a chance to influence.  A good example of their potential contribution is the
field of economic project evaluation.  A good system for evaluating public
sector projects and programs requires expertise that goes down to the level
where each individual project is evaluated.  This requires hundreds, even
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thousands of well-prepared people.  It also requires a framework of evaluation
that is based on sound economic principles, and a top leadership that is willing
to stand up, at least some of the time, against the political pressures that
build up, even behind bad projects (based on the interests of the particular
groups that benefit from the project while others bear much, or most of its
cost).  Our experience has shown that even rather rudimentary systems of
economic project evaluation, given half a chance, can save billions of dollars
for the citizens and taxpayers of a country, mainly by helping to stop huge
expenditures on enormously wasteful projects.  Other “working economists”
in the public sector can contribute in similar ways, serving as antibodies to
combat anti-economic ideas and policies, and/or as carriers and supporters
of sound economic concepts, contributing step by step to the progress of
economic policy and its implementation.
In light of all this, what tasks do I see for CEMA and its sister institutions
as they forge the future of economic research and teaching throughout Latin
America?  Among the many that could be listed, I have selected four:
1) Never fail to emphasize fundamentals in both teaching and research.
2) Try seriously to distill, out of the huge corpus of knowledge inherited
form the past, those parts that are most relevant for understanding the
world we see around us.
3) Be skeptical and wary when exploring the frontiers of economic theory
and research.
4) Participate actively and eagerly in the struggle to bring diagnostics to
center stage in both teaching and research.
These will be dealt with in turn in the sections that follow.
II. Emphasizing Fundamentals
I had the good fortune to study economics at a time (1946-49) when
and in a place (the University of Chicago) where the fundamentals of the
discipline held center stage.  And even more good luck brought me back to
the University of Chicago for a long period (1953-91) during most of which
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that university was very likely the leading center of applied and policy
economics.  These experiences had a defining influence on my professional
life and thinking.  They helped create the vision and, if you like, the biases
that I will be expressing here.
Perhaps a good starting point is Milton Friedman’s course in price theory,
whose content is enshrined for all to see in his book of the same name.  The
question that many will ask is why an economist as profound, as versatile
and as brilliant as Friedman would devote virtually the whole of a two-quarter
sequence in graduate-level price theory to an extended exegesis on the
subjects of supply, demand and markets.  The answer is, because he thought
they were so important as to take priority over the more esoteric and frilly
topics he left out.  I learned from that sequence, more than 50 years ago, that
there was a great deal to be gained from revisiting supply and demand many
times, at progressively subtler, deeper and richer levels.  So much so that I
have repeated the experience on my own, all through my professional life.
Even after 50 years of this, I feel I am still learning, still deepening and
enriching my understanding of those simple topics — supply, demand and
markets.
I have elsewhere stated that I attribute to Friedman another purpose in
making his course so totally fundamentals-oriented.  In my opinion, he did
not want us to learn price theory but to imbibe it — to make it part of our
natural way of thinking, observing, and reacting to what we see.
That same spirit — of economics as a set of tools whose raison d’etre
was to be used to help us understand and interpret what we see in the world
around us — came to Chicago students not only from Friedman but from
many other sources as well — T.W. Schultz, D. Gale Johnson and George
Tolley in agricultural economics; George Stigler in industrial organization;
Gary Becker in the economics of the family and of human behavior in general;
Harry Johnson and Robert Mundell in international economics; H. Gregg
Lewis, Sherwin Rosen and James Heckman in labor economics; Larry
Sjaastad and myself in public finance and in the economics of developing
countries; Robert Fogel and David Galenson in economic history.  From
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whom in this entire group could you get any sense that economics was
anything but a real-world science?  Every one of these economists had a
deep belief in and respect for economic theory — but in the sense that theory
gained merit only by helping us to better understand and interpret (and maybe
at times even predict) reality.  Put another way — you can scan the economic
stratosphere and heavens, and you’ll find plenty of postulates and theorems
and lemmas, but not from any of this group of economists.
I go to these lengths to describe the aura of Chicago in the era of the
listed people because I truly believe it was an unusually rich source of leading
real-world economists.  Not only was it the cradle of the founders and of
many leading professors at CEMA, it had similar concentrated influence at
the Universities of Cuyo and Tucumán in Argentina, at the Catholic University
and the University of Chile in Santiago, and at ITAM in Mexico City.  Directly
or indirectly its alumni played way more than their expected share of the key
roles in the great economic reforms of these three countries, and of Panama
and Uruguay as well.  And so too in the main international organizations,
where they have occupied far more than their expected share of leading posts.
I mention all these things because I believe that this influence and impact
came about largely because of the nature and type of training that
characterized Chicago during the years in question – most particularly, its
fierce concentration on fundamentals and its unrelenting real-world
orientation.  Deeply, almost with a religious fervor, I believe this is the way
CEMA and the other leading centers of economic research and training in
Latin America ought to focus their activities.  If anybody is to engage in
stratospheric and maybe astronomical economics, let it be large institutions
in wealthy countries, which can better afford such a luxury.
III.  Decanting for Current Relevance
It is probably best for me to inform you, at the outset of this section, that I
have been involved for some time with the work of the Instituto Superior de
Economistas del Gobierno (ISEG), here in Buenos Aires.  This institute deals
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with various aspects of the training of government economists, but my work
to date has been concentrated on master’s level courses that the Institute
sponsors in four universities (among them CEMA) for the purposes of
“finishing” the training of entry-level economists and of upgrading the
professional preparation of some who are already working in government jobs.
Precisely the spirit that I tried to express in the preceding section — my
deep belief in fundamentals and in the power of economic policy — has led
me to take the tasks of ISEG very seriously.  In this context it is easy to see
the importance of decanting for current relevance.  The ISEG course originally
covered four semesters, spread over a 2-year period.  Recently, for budgetary
and administrative reasons, it was changed to three semesters compressed
into a single 12-month span.  In either case the most important budget
constraint, from an academic point of view, was that of time.  Every topic,
every issue, every problem that is treated in such a program gets there at the
expense of something else.  In a sense, picking the course titles is the easy
part — Micro, Macro, Quantitative Methods, Money and Capital Markets,
International Trade, Public Finance, Project Evaluation, Development
Economics, Labor Economics, Agricultural Economics — all quite clearly
have a valid claim (certainly in most Latin American countries).  To these
ISEG adds half-courses in the Economics of Education, Energy Economics,
the Economics of Transport and Communications, and Natural Resources
and the Environment.
The more challenging task is deciding what goes into a course, once its
title appears on the list.  Now there are only 48 classroom hours (including
exam times) for a full course, 24 for a half course.  Huge tradeoffs exist as
one contemplates what should be the coverage within each course.
Let me try to take you down the road of thinking about these tradeoffs.  I
prefer to take a positive approach, focusing on what has the greatest claim to
be in the course.  That way, in a sense, what gets left out is what there is no
room for.
In the field of the real side of international trade, I think the right frame is
that of a small open economy facing many given prices in world markets.
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Here is where one discusses issues like tariff and commercial policy.  Here is
where one sees the key role of the real exchange rate in determining a
country’s comparative advantage at any given moment.  Here one analyzes
effective protection, Dutch disease, and the real exchange rate effects of
capital inflows (spent on  nontradables) and capital outflows.  Here is where
one discusses the pros and cons of uniform tariffs.  As a next step one relaxes
the “price-taking” assumption for at least some exports and explores the
pros and cons of using export taxes to try to exploit the downward slope of
the demand curves a country might face in world markets.  One notes in
passing that no developing country has monopsony power over its import
goods , so the optimum tariff concept has no real meaning for it.  (Import
tariffs in small countries may, however, produce indirect positive external
effects through reducing exports characterized by some degree of as yet
unexploited monopoly power.)
In the field of monetary economics I see center stage being occupied by:
a)  the demand function for real monetary balances;  b)  the consolidated
balance sheet of the monetary-cum-banking system;   c)  the key monetary
approach concept that people work down undesired real cash balances by
spending more, and make up shortfalls of real cash balances by spending
less than they otherwise would, and  d)  the idea that new net borrowing
gives rise to spending in excess of what would otherwise occur.
The demand function for real cash balances is a more subtle concept
than most economists appreciate.  The holding of time and savings deposits,
for example, should be regarded as a negative function of the rate of inflation
and as a positive function of the nominal rate of interest on these deposits.
That is, the own-price elasticity of demand for deposits (or better, of supply
of funds in this form) is positive.  It is the cross-price elasticities that are
negative, as that of the demand for currency with respect to the interest rates
on time and savings deposits and on bonds of different types.  All forms of
money holding are, of course, negatively related to the expected rate of
inflation, but it is really a mistake to treat the demand for real monetary
balances as a function simply of a rate of interest that supposedly incorporates
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the expected rate of inflation together with a real interest rate.    It is much
better to treat the inflation rate and the various interest rates as separate
variables in this key demand function.
The consolidated balance sheet that is relevant for monetary analysis has
M2  (or, more generally, “broad money”), as the principal liability of the
monetary-cum-banking system.  Its main assets are net foreign assets, credit
to the public sector, and credit to the private (or productive) sector.  In a
simple but common case, net foreign assets are mainly the international
reserves holdings of the central bank, and are determined by past history
plus the current policy of that institution.  Banking system holdings of
government obligations are in this simple case determined by how much
credit the government has insisted that they (most often the Central Bank)
provide.  Finally, what is left of available funds is what goes to the private
sector, with the interest rate on bank loans (unless it is controlled) being
determined by the scarcity value of these funds, perhaps supplemented by
inflows from abroad, in the local plaza.  Many other scenarios can, of course,
be developed using the same general framework; including eliminating the
distinction between the two types of domestic credit.  Among the things that
can be easily shown with this framework is how any effort by the government
to capture the whole inflation tax  [(M/P)(DP/P)]  in a context of steady
inflation will have as its natural consequence the steady erosion (toward
zero) of the real volume of private sector credit.
The monetary approach idea that excess cash balances are sooner or later
going to be spent is such a vital concept that I find it hard to understand why
it is not a living part of all economists’ vision of how the world works.  It lets
one see easily how putting newly printed money in the hands of the public
tends to stimulate demand, and how arbitrarily curtailing the money supply
puts a damper on the economy as people attempt  to  rebuild their real
monetary balances.  Also, it shows one a less familiar scenario of how a drop
in  (Md/P)  stimulates the economy, and how a drop in  (Md/P)  accommodated
by a corresponding fall in  Ms  is simply neutral in its influence on effective
demand.
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The idea of net borrowing being an independent argument in demand
functions is not new, but neither is it “common practice”.  Some international
trade models have used total real expenditure in place of real income as a
determinant of demand, but this assumes that borrowed funds are spent in a
pattern similar to increments of income.  This being quite easy to disprove,
one is left with treating net increments to credit as separate variables from
income in determining demand.  I believe that not only do we want the
increment of credit to be a separate variable, with a coefficient different from
that applying to income, but we want to always keep in our minds the idea that
this year’s increment to credit may be spent in ways that are totally different
from last year’s.  One year may witness a boom in industrial investment;
another year a surge in consumer durables demand; yet another year a sharp
rise in residential construction — each of these, say, being financed by its
respective increment of borrowing from abroad.  Particularly critical, in the
analysis of real-world scenarios, is the issue of whether the credit increment
is being spent on tradables or (predominantly) on nontradables.
Several of the ideas put forth in this section are conveniently summarized
in the following demand equation for tradable goods:
Td = a0 + a1y + a2(pT/pd) + a3[(Ms-Md)/pd] + a4DBf (1)
where
Td = demand for tradable goods and services
y = real income
pT = price of tradable goods
pd = general price level
(Md/pd) = real money balances demanded
(Ms/pd) = actual supply of real money balances
DBf = increment of credit from abroad.
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I like to present this as a demand for tradable goods because it fits so
neatly into the history of thought in the field of international trade.  All the
different processes of international adjustment are reflected here.  The
coefficient  a2  embodies the elasticities approach,  a3  the monetary approach
and  a4  the income-expenditure approach.  In point of fact, however, this is
not just an international trade story – the same type of demand equation can
(and in my opinion should) be used quite generally.  One important provision
is that we should expect the coefficients  a3  and  a4  to be potentially quite
unstable from episode to episode, while  a1  and  a2  should have whatever
degree of stability one associates with income and price coefficients generally.
IV.  Maintaining a Healthy Skepticism
While in the previous section I chose to focus on the positive side —
how we should proceed, what we should emphasize – this section’s topic of
skepticism practically forces me to the negative side, i.e., to illustrate how
we can go wrong by accepting too naively certain concepts or approaches.
Let me state at the outset that I am a firm, even passionate believer in
simple economic models.  I draw a sharp line between models whose
mechanics we can actually comprehend, and those that are so complicated
that, if we act on what they tell us, it is because we trust rather than understand
their results.  I cannot imagine going to a ministry or a central bank citing an
urgent need for policy action or policy change, and having to respond, when
asked why I am pressing this case, “you must do this, — because that is what
my model says should be done.”  Among other things, it is almost certain
that somebody else’s model will, at the same time and place, be indicating
some different action.
So simple models are needed, just so we can understand what they are
really saying, i.e., so we can explain to  a minister or Central Bank president
what is the precise causal chain through which our proposed policy will
work.  But, since the complexities of the world are infinitely greater than
any man-made model can capture, we have no alternative not just to
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simplifying but to greatly oversimplifying, any time we seek to reduce those
complexities to something we really can understand.  But herein lies the
problem:  most oversimplifications will end up missing the point, just getting
things wrong.  In our work in economics, we look for artful and meaningful
oversimplifications, that somehow capture the essence of the situation or
problem or mechanism that we are studying.  This is the wonder of the time-
tested tools that represent the fundamentals of our discipline.
But not all of our oversimplifications are as robust as the concepts of
supply and demand, or as the demand function for real monetary balances.
And in fact, some quite fragile ones have somehow found their way to center
stage in the economic literature of recent decades.  The rest of this section is
devoted to a brief review of a small selection of these.
The Representative Consumer
Economic models embodying a representative consumer are very
convenient ways to illustrate certain basic economic forces.  What these
models do, in effect, is display the analogies between almost any economy
and Robinson Crusoe’s island autarchy.  When Crusoe saved, he also invested,
and that is true of modern economies too in a certain very real sense.  Faced
with variable harvests of storable foodstuffs, Crusoe would practice
“consumption smoothing”, building up stocks in boom years and running
them down when harvests were bad.  This, too, is what much more complex
modern economics tend to do.  So the analogy is apt, up to a point.
But the analogy fails badly when applied to big macroeconomic events.
The Latin American debt crisis experiences of the 1980s are a fine example.
Here borrowing reached its peak at the same time as output and income
were peaking, and loans were paid back when output and income were hitting
their lows.  What we see, in this period is, if anything, consumption de-
smoothing.  At the heart of it were changes in expectations, both those of
foreign lenders and those of domestic investors and other economic agents.
I believe that for studying the debt crisis experiences of Latin America, as
well as the current crisis experiences in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and
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other countries of Southeast Asia, we have to separate the saving decision
from that of investment, and recognize that the big shocks come from the
side of investments and of foreign financing.
When you stop to consider it, it is hard to think of any way of dealing
with the macroeconomic fluctuations that we observe in the world without a
sharp separation between the decision to save and the decision to invest.
This is even true for a closed economy, where saving and investment must
always be equal, ex post, though not ex ante.  In short, it is the volatility of
investment that drives economic cycles, and the decisions to invest are made
by different people, with quite different considerations in mind, than the
decisions to save.  Hence we should in all such cases model investment and
saving decisions separately.
Until recently, I was quite happy with the use of the representative
consumer assumption when studying and modeling economic growth.  But
now I no longer am.  As I have revisited the topic of economic growth in
recent years, I want to play up the role of investment and keep it distinct
from the role of saving.  In the first place, the standard breakdown of growth
sets up separate categories for the contributions of increased labor force,
improved quality of labor, increased capital stock and total productivity
improvements.  Right at this point we should recognize that increased capital
stock is the variable in question, not increased saving by the entity whose
growth we are considering.  The need for distinguishing investment from
saving is obvious when we are considering the growth of firms or industries
or cities, for all of which the link between saving and investment is quite
weak.  The need for maintaining the distinction as we aggregate into provinces
or states or regions or nations is best defended by noting that economic
growth really takes place at the level of the firm, and must ultimately be
understood in that context.  A subsidiary reason for maintaining the distinction
is that even provinces, states, regions and nations are open economies, where
at times more than half of investment is financed from outside, just as at
times more than half of saving is invested someplace other than within the
entity.
Just to close this particular section, let me outline the vision of the growth
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process to which my recent work has led me.  In this vision, real cost
reductions are at the heart of the growth process.  Where opportunities for
real cost reduction are great, they typically give rise to increased investments,
which promise (and usually deliver, at least for some time) unusually high
rates of return.  A “good” growth experience thus displays higher-than-normal
rates of investment, plus higher-than-normal real rates of return, plus higher-
than-normal rates of real cost reduction.  “Bad” growth experiences show
the opposite – real cost increases, low rates of return and low (sometimes
even negative) rates of investment.  This syndrome of bad growth experiences
often sits side by side with good experiences in the same industry, as
successfully innovating firms in that industry thrive and expand, while their
less fortunate competitors are driven to the wall.  Real cost increases in such
cases often stem from output being driven down well below the levels
appropriate for existing installed capacity.  It is easy to reflect the syndrome
that combines the contributions of investment, rate of return, and real cost
reduction if one pinpoints investment as a key variable to target.  In contrast,
one gets virtually nowhere if one targets saving as the key concept.
Ricardian Equivalence
To understand what I mean in urging you to be skeptical about ideas,
even about fashionable ones, consider Ricardian equivalence.  Just try to
analyze any major Latin American inflation with a model that implies that
there is no difference between financing additional public expenditure with
incremental debt or with incremental taxes.  Very obviously, fiscal deficits
lay at the heart of nearly all Latin American inflations, and although we do
leave room in our scenario for the financing of such deficits in non-
inflationary ways, the fact is that such sources were insufficient to deal with
the problem.
Just as in the case of the representative consumer, one can build a scenario
in which Ricardian equivalence more or less rigorously holds.  Today’s
increment to debt must be paid someday, or equivalently its real interest costs
must be carried indefinitely.  Ultimately, this scenario says, taxes must come
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into play to make these payments.  With the most convenient assumptions, the
present value of these future payments equals today’s increment to debt, hence
people will be reacting to today’s actual taxes in one case, and to an equivalent
sum representing the present value of future taxes in the other case.  Why
should their responses to these two “equivalent” stimuli not be the same?  This
is the line of argument supporting Ricardian equivalence.
Many papers have been written suggesting different reasons, some of
them quite subtle, why Ricardian equivalence might not hold in the real world.
But I prefer to focus here on a single main idea – not whether it holds, but
when it gets to hold.  The first step has to do with the perception of future tax
liabilities.  If people always and accurately perceive all future liabilities,
they are likely to act on this perception, and if their reaction to future liabilities
is similar to the way they react to current liabilities, we have Ricardian
equivalence.  The second step says that for the tax that’s due next quarter, or
next month, or tomorrow, these conditions are quite likely to be met.  But the
third step says that we do not have a very clear view, even of what our income
will be five or ten years from now, nor of what the tax code will then look
like, nor of how we will fit into it to generate our future tax liability.  Thus
we would have a hard time taking that liability into account, even if our
government never engaged in deficit financing.  Finally, if all we know at
this moment is that the government has added a certain amount to its debt, it
is rational for us to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, waiting until our available
information set gives us a reasonable clue as to what we will owe, and then
incorporating that liability in our financial and economic planning.  Of course,
we can always spread over many future years our response to today’s (or
tomorrow’s) tax increase.
Let me take you down a particular path with respect to Ricardian
equivalence, which to me leaves useful messages about economic thinking
and observation in general.  At the center of this path is the idea that the
Austrian economists were right in considering that introspection is an
important part of economic thinking.  The short version of my story is simply
this.  Ask any true believers in Ricardian equivalence how they change their
consumption decisions upon learning that the government has just issued an
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extra $10 billion in debt.  Then compare that with the changes they would
make if they received (or quite specifically expected at a known future date)
an extra tax assessment of any given amount.
The longer version of the story harks to the modern analysis of financial
markets and portfolio choice.  On the whole, there are no “money trees” out
there, whereby anyone can get rich quick.  But there is a legitimate profession
of financial advising, in which serious practitioners suggest quite different
portfolios and investment strategies to people depending on their situation
and objectives.  These same advisers will tell me how to behave if my children
mature and “leave the nest”, or if I am struck with an incapacitating disability,
or if I win the lottery.  Their books are not at all explicit, however, in how I
should modify my behavior in response to a $10 billion increment in
government debt.  The challenge to supporters of Ricardian equivalence is
for them to fill in this gap.
Modeling Monetary Policy and the Banking System
The message on this point is that it is a terrible violation of reality to
consider monetary policy as being fully summarized in the Central Bank’s
issuance of monetary base or high-powered money,  H.  Just as one should
not treat savers and investors as if they were a single Robinson Crusoe, one
should not blur the vital distinction between borrowers from the financial
sector on the one hand, and those who make resources available to it on the
other.  Working with the consolidated balance sheet of the monetary-cum-
banking system is, to my mind, essential for any macro modeling in which
monetary policy decisions play any significant role.
I do not even remember when I began to use the consolidated balance
sheet as the focal point of my own thinking about monetary matters.  It may
have been as early as 1950, when I spent a summer working at the
International Monetary Fund, and it may have been as late as 1956, when I
first started working on the Chilean economy.  In any case, I can honestly
say that over all the intervening years, this way of thinking has never let me
down.  I immediately give great credit to the designers of the tables in
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International Financial Statistics, whose “Monetary Survey”, built precisely
around this concept, dates from the late 1940s.
The distinction between focusing just on  H  and focusing on the entire
consolidated balance sheet would not matter if  M2  were always equal to
mH,  with  m  being a constant money multiplier, and if credit to the government
and  credit to  the  private  sector  were  likewise firmly tied to   H, say with
Cg = g1H  and  Cp = g2H.  But what drove me away from focusing on  H  in the
first place, and what has continuously reinforced the wisdom of that decision,
was experience and observation.  There are just too many ways one can be
led astray by focusing just on  H.  Central Banks have regularly modified the
money multiplier by changing reserve requirements, which I have seen as
high as 80 and 90 percent and as low as 2%.  Governments can create special
bonds that are then allowed to function as bank reserves, thus changing the
amount of effective high-powered money without the Central Bank’s taking
any action at all, and without the “statistical  H” changing.  And people
themselves can significantly modify the money multiplier by changing their
tastes for holding currency, demand deposits, time and savings deposits, CDs,
and the like.  Some of these changes can come as a consequence of technical
innovations like credit cards; some can derive from changes in the rules
governing bank behavior (e.g., permitting the payment of competitive interest
rates). Some can even come as a result of general macroeconomic policy
such as changes in the rate of actual and expected inflation.  Reducing the
rate of inflation can even work to give a special push to Md
2  by turning a
maximum nominal interest rate (say, 20% per year) that with high inflation
was strongly negative in real terms, into one that ends up not constraining
market equilibrium in any way, as when supply meets demand at a nominal
rate of 10% or 15% after the price level has stabilized..
But the main reason for focusing on the consolidated banking system is
because the main liability of that system is something that is ultimately
determined in real terms by the balances that the public wants to hold.  As I
see it, the monetary authorities have to watch with care the behavior of people
in this regard, and then take action that makes sense.  If people want more
real balances as an inflationary economy stabilizes, the authorities should
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not hold  H  constant (forcing an absolute deflation) but should move to
accommodate people’s changing tastes.  If the government resorts to
inflationary financing of its deficits, the monetary authorities should prevent
this from totally eroding private sector credit, even if permitting such erosion
causes an increase in the resulting “equilibrium” rate of inflation.  The deficit
causes inflation; inflation reduces (M2/P)  and with it the total real volume of
domestic credit outstanding.  The monetary authorities should seek a division
of this real domestic credit into an acceptable portion going to the private
sector and its complement going to the government.  Likewise, a monetary
authority pursuing a fixed exchange rate (or tablita) policy should realize
that a monetary target is in the final analysis incompatible with such a policy.
Just as  credit to the government should not be allowed to squeeze real credit
to the private sector indefinitely, so, under a fixed rate or tablita  system, one
should not allow net foreign assets to expand indefinitely, similarly squeezing
real private sector credit down to (or close to) zero.  At some point the lesson
should be learned (and applied) that with a fixed exchange rate system the
only way for the real exchange rate to adjust is via price levels and that an
equilibrium fall in the real exchange rate that is needed to accommodate an
export price boom or a large capital inflow should simply be allowed to
occur.  The resulting rise in the internal price level should properly be thought
of not as “inflation” but rather as an equilibrium adjustment of relative prices.
The virtue of focusing on  (M2/P) should be very well appreciated in
Argentina, where during the first quarter of the tequila crisis total foreign
assets of the monetary authorities fell by more than 35%, and net foreign
assets by more than 50%.  The strict rules of a currency board would have
required a contraction of similar order of magnitude in  M2,  with devastating
effects on credit to the private sector and on real output.  But, in a magnificent
display of economic statesmanship and ingenuity, the Argentine authorities
managed to hold  M2  to a fall of only about 13,5%, mostly reflecting the
reduction of international reserves.  Credit to the private sector fell by only a
little more than 2%.  This miracle was accomplished, as most of you know,
by a sharp reduction of the reserve (encaje) requirements applied to
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commercial banks, and by taking advantage of a sly provision of the
convertibility law, which allowed certain Argentine government bonds
denominated in dollars to be counted as backing for high-powered money.
Thus while Central Bank foreign assets (both gross and net) fell by some $6
billion, high-powered money only fell by about $3 billion and banking system
credit to the private sector by about $1 billion.  I do not believe that this
miracle would have occurred had not the Argentine authorities been very
watchful both over  M2  and over credit to the private sector.  This alertness,
in my view, lies behind one of the greatest monetary policy achievements I
have witnessed in some 50 years of professional life.
Modeling International Capital Flows
This is the area where I have been most troubled by the treatments I keep
encountering in workshop and journal presentations.  The most common
treatment departs from an international nominal interest rate  i*,  and moves
from there to a domestic interest rate  id  by adding a country risk premium  d
plus the expected rate of devaluation  Ã.  These two adjustments meet the
conditions for covered (or uncovered) interest arbitrage, taking the risk
premium into account.
I have problems with this treatment in several related dimensions.  The
source of all of them is the assumption that the country in question faces an
infinitely elastic supply curve of credit and of capital.  I see this assumption
as implying a total de-linking of domestic saving and domestic investment.
Under this assumption, all increments to saving in effect go abroad.  There
is no crowding out of alternative investments, no matter how big an investment
boom gets.  Likewise, there is no tightening of local interest rates, when
domestic saving is cut in half, nor is there any easing of these rates when
domestic savings double.  Further, the economic opportunity cost of capital
is totally uninfluenced by the internal marginal productivity of capital or by
the tax distortions that work on both the saving and investment sides of the
capital market.
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The above are sort of “structural” implications of the modeling
assumption.  They apply to the middle and long run as well as the short.
They apply in perfectly normal periods as well as in crises.  But if one focuses
directly on crisis situations, one sees immediately the debility of the infinite-
elasticity assumption.  Imagine telling the finance minister of Mexico or
Argentina in early 1995, or the president of the Central Bank of Chile in
early 1983, or of Indonesia or Thailand today, “Sir, don’t worry, all you have
to do is borrow abroad to cover your needs for foreign currency.  To be sure,
you have to pay a high premium, but at the price   (i* + d )  you can get all the
money you require.”  They would all consider the assertion laughable, and
rightly so.
The fact is that nearly all developing countries, nearly all the time, face
upward rising supply curves of foreign funds. As clients of lenders, they do
not fit into the mold of the capital asset pricing model, where the price of a
class of assets depends on just a few determining  variables,  so that for
given values of these variables those assets face an infinitely elastic demand
(= supply of funds).  No, a developing country’s capital market is more like
the different lots in a resort development. Some buyers are willing to pay
very high prices; they usually buy the first lots. Others are more reluctant,
and developers often have to cut their initial prices to attract their demand.
To be sure, specific attributes of each lot may cloud the real-world application
of this story, but I believe it would be true even in cases of fully homogeneous
lots.  We are simply dealing with a downward sloping demand curve,
representing buyers placing different valuations on a lot.
I believe this analogy applies to developing countries as they face the
world capital market.  Not only does the supply curve of funds facing a country
slope upward, but it shifts around through time.  No commercial lenders
wanted to lend to Chile in 1973 (or even 1975) or to Peru in 1987.  Yet with
time these same countries  found  it easier  to get loans, until in the late
1980s and early 1990s  Chile  effectively   placed  a tax  on  inflows  of
funds, so as to permit an internal equilibrium interest rate that was higher
than  (i* + d + Ã).
Trying to capture the essence of what is happening on these cases, I like
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to think of, say, four risk categories in which the international capital market
can place a country.  In each case the foreign borrowing rate rises as  Bf /y
increases.  But both the intercept and the slope of the curve change as a
country shifts from one risk category to another.  In category  D,  the worst
one, lending might begin at LIBOR plus 4 or 5 percent, and this rate move
up rapidly as credit increased to a limit that was but a low fraction of a year’s
GDP.  By the time a country reaches category  B,  however, lending might
begin at, say, LIBOR plus 1 or 2 percent, with this rate moving up quite
slowly until a credit limit of, say, a full year’s GDP is reached.  Finally one
gets to countries like Luxembourg (category  A), which are integral parts of
the world capital market, and where, for most practical purposes, the CAPM
model can be used, implying a (nearly) infinitely elastic supply of funds at a
zero or negligible premium over LIBOR.
Working with actual data for Latin American countries, I have found it
far preferable to treat the annual capital flow (or net resource transfer) into
the country as an exogenous variable, rather than taking the supply of funds
as infinitely elastic.  But I am now of the opinion that it is even better to
work directly with a shifting supply curve of funds, passing through the points
(0,
*
t i )  and  (Bft, ift),  where  if  is the actual rate specified on new loans in
dollars (or other major currency).  Such a curve could track a country like
Chile as it moved, say, from  category  D  in 1973 to category  B+  in 1980,
then back to, say, C-  in 1983, drifting finally up to  A-  by around 1990.  All
three assumptions, this one of a rising curve with intercept at  , i
*
t   and the
alternatives of a flat curve at  ift  and of a vertical curve at  Bft,  are built to
pass through each observed point.  The important differences come when
we simulate responses to assumed disturbances, where, at least in my opinion,
the upward rising curve has strong advantages over the other two, while at
the same time its shifts capture the changing risk status of a country.
V.  Emphasizing Diagnostics in Teaching and Research
It never ceases to amaze me how lax we in the economics profession
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have been in the subject of diagnostics.  I cannot remember ever having seen
or heard of a course exclusively devoted to this subject, and not much beyond
the simplest supply-and-demand examples typically appear in any course.
The simplest case here is the link between price controls on the one hand,
and black or gray markets on the other.  Next might come the estimation of
the free-market equilibrium price on the basis of the observed black-market
and official prices in such cases.  An important and easy macroeconomic
case is the identification of the phenomenon of transfer-induced Dutch disease
in countries like El Salvador and the Dominican Republic.  Both these
countries “suffer” from a chronically appreciated real exchange rate.
Producers of tradable goods are constantly complaining about this, and
pressing for a nominal devaluation, thinking that will solve their problem.  A
proper diagnosis of the situation leads to an understanding that the low real
exchange rate is not an aberration but an equilibrium phenomenon, due to
the chronic abundance of dollars created by emigrant remittances.  Given
this diagnosis, one can predict in advance that attempts to create a more
favorable environment for the production of tradable goods by devaluing
the nominal exchange rate will have only a transitory effect on the real rate.
In the end one can predict that, barring changes in other real determining
variables, internal prices will rise to restore the equilibrium real exchange
rate, in the process nullifying the stimulating effect of the nominal devaluation.
This scenario has played itself out, as predicted, in these and other countries
of similar characteristics, when large nominal devaluations were attempted.
The preceding examples are the easy cases.  But there are many others
that are more difficult and that represent major challenges to the entire
profession for the years ahead.  In what follows I shall set out just a few of
these “areas of challenge”.
Tracking Shifts in the Demand for Real Monetary Balances
I had the good fortune, recently, to sit next to Alan Greenspan at an
economics luncheon.  I took advantage of the occasion to test out on him my
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own interpretation of Federal Reserve policy and strategy during his time as
chairman of the Board of Governors.  I had for quite some time inferred that
he and the other governors took very seriously the concept of the demand
for real monetary balances, but that they felt it was not stable enough to
support, say, a constant rate of monetary expansion.  Even after they included
in this function all the variables they thought belonged there, it still exhibited
important shifts that they were unable to predict in advance.  But it was easy
to observe each shift, once it happened, simply as the residual of the actual
observation from the one predicted by their best available money demand
function (or functions).  Then came the real job, of interpreting these residuals.
They can be ignored if they are purely random, stemming from errors of
measurement or from highly transitory shocks.  But they should be
accommodated by changes in  M  when they reflect genuine changes in
people’s tastes and behavior.  The task, then, is to do the necessary detective
work so as to have an idea of when the current and recent residuals fall into
one category or another, and when they do appear to represent a genuine
change of tastes or behavior, to try to guess at an interpretation.
The detective work in question entails trying to examine all the evidence
including, among other things, data disaggregated by state and region, by
category of money holding, by type of holder, etc.  If household cash balances
in 50 different states are all falling below the predicted levels, it is hard to
maintain that one is facing a random shift of a function. The task then is to
pursue other types of evidence and other trails, in an effort to really understand
what happened.
At that luncheon, I posed to Greenspan my hypothesis that the Fed really
thought in these terms and that the research arm included a whole corps of
detectives, some constantly trying to interpret residuals, others engaged in
the related task of improving the underlying demand functions for real
balances.  When I asked Greenspan whether I had described reasonably well
what the Fed actually does, he replied “Yes, but you make that detective
work sound a lot easier than it really is!”
To give you an idea of one line of detective work, I can report on an
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experiment we performed a few years ago.  We started with a standard
specification in which the stock of real monetary balances was a function of
real income, the rate of inflation, plus sometimes other variables.  We were
considering shifts in this basic “stock demand” function.  At one extreme, if
all shifts were permanent, they would follow a random walk, and the right
way to estimate the function would be in first differences.  At the other
extreme, if all shifts were purely temporary, coming in one period and going
away (being replaced by a new one) in the next, the right way to estimate the
function would be in the levels of the variables.  These two could be
considered as extreme cases of an autoregressive process, so we did estimates
imposing autoregression coefficients of 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 between
successive residual terms.  Then, having fitted five different variants of each
of several countries’ demand functions for real balances, we looked at the
residuals implied by each.  We tried to put the shifts on a comparable basis,
reflecting in each case the shift from where the basic “stock demand function”
stood last period and where it stood in each current period.  Somewhat to
our surprise, and much to our satisfaction, we found a very high correlation
between all five series for the implied (comparable) shifts.  This meant that
the identification of the shifts that Greenspan’s detectives would try to study
and understand was quite robust across the five different specifications.  It
made us much more confident that there was a genuine reality of behavior
underlying the shifts taking place in any period.  This robustness was good
news, but the real task of studying the shifts in depth, and trying really to
understand them, still lies ahead.
Studying the Phenomenon of Overshooting
One of my favorite examples of dynamic adjustment is a hypothetical
case in which the rate of monetary expansion was constant at, say, 5% per
year for some time, and then jumped to, say 25% per year and stayed there.
The equilibrium response to this change is an increase in the inflation rate of
20% per year, and a reduction in the equilibrium level of real cash balances.
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Assuming no underlying real growth in order to simplify the exposition, we
have a shift from an equilibrium inflation rate of 5% to one of 25%.  This
change will cause the equilibrium level of real cash balances  (M/p)  to fall,
a result which can only occur if, over some adjustment period, the price
level has a cumulative percentage increase that is greater than that of the
money supply.
A super-rational expectations adjustment [full information and accurate
expectations at all times, except the moment  (t*)  of the shock itself (which
is new information at that instant)] would have the price level adjust upward
immediately at  t*,  reducing  (M/p)  instantaneously to its new equilibrium
level.  So the time path of  (M/p)  would be a simple step function, with one
step downward at  t*.  The time paths of  m  (= DM/M)  and  p   (=  DP/P)
would be upward step functions, jumping from 5% per year to 25% per year,
exactly at  t*.  But the  p function also would have a spike at  t*,  which
would be precisely sufficient to instantaneously bring  (M/p)  down to its
new equilibrium level.
This is obviously not the way price level adjustments occur in the real
world.  If something like the postulated change in monetary expansion were
to occur unexpectedly, we can be certain that the inflation rate p  would rise
somewhat  gradually.  Until it reached 25%, it would  be   less than m,  so
(M/p)  would be increasing.  Hence  p  has to overshoot, passing through
25% and for some time staying above it, driving  (M/p)  down not just to its
initial equilibrium level, but through it to its new, lower equilibrium.
In the scenario just described, we have an overshoot of  p  as well as an
overshoot of  (M/p).  It does not take very strong assumptions — just any lag
in the adjustments of  p  to that of m, in order to make this overshooting an
absolutely necessary part of the adjustment process in the case examined.
In other cases, overshooting also seems to be a virtually necessary part of
the adjustment process.  If some product experiences a rapid rise in demand,
its new price will be determined by a movement along a short-run supply curve,
based on a set of existing fixed factors of production.  As these fixed factors
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more and more elastic.  The intersections of these shifting supply curves with
the new demand curve trace out an overshoot in which price may have started
at 100, then quickly jumped to a short-run equilibrium at 150, and then
gradually drifted down to a new long-run equilibrium at, say, 120.
Speculative elements played no role in the two scenarios just presented,
but they do enter importantly in real-world stock markets, and sometimes
also in organized commodity and currency markets.  There are different ways
to model a speculative overshoot or bubble.  The one I like best builds on the
familiar Wall Street dichotomy between “technicians” and “fundamentalists”.
A crude definition would say that the technicians bet on the prolongation of
existing trends (betting on inertia, as it were), while the fundamentalists
believe that the market obeys the principle of gravity, tending to be pulled to
a central equilibrium point that is determined by the fundamentals of each
case.  Thinking in these terms, one describes an “overshoot” as a movement
initially dominated by technicians extrapolating, say, an upward or downward
trend.  As the market gets farther and farther away from its medium- or long-
run center of gravity, however, more and more erstwhile technicians turn
into fundamentalists, and turn from betting on a continued trend to instead
betting on a return to the fundamentals.  In this story, everybody is right at
least some of the time, so we can see why both technicians and
fundamentalists have passed the test of survival.  We see, too, how a market
overshoot described and thought of by participants in these terms could easily
track an overshoot that traced the reaction of, say, copper prices to an
unexpected upward surge in demand.
The individual market participants, however, never really “know” if they
are in an overshoot, or, if they are, whether the price trend will continue for
some time before  the fundamentals reassert themselves.  So everybody is
plagued by the conflicting emotions of greed and fear, which many veterans
say are the forces that really drive speculative markets.  Among other things,
most participants in such markets end up unwilling to place large fractions
of their wealth on any one or two bets.  This is one reason why overshoots
often end up being quite prolonged — they don’t attract enough “converts”
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to fundamentalism early in the process, as those who bet too early on the
reversal of an overshoot often end up with huge losses.
To get a feel for overshooting in a current context, think of the recent
history of the Indonesian rupiah.  Starting, pre-crisis, at about Rp 2400 to
the dollar, the rate moved quickly to Rp 5000, then to Rp 10,000, and finally
to over Rp 15,000.  At the most recent sighting, it was oscillating between
Rp 10,000 and Rp 11,000 to the dollar.  I believe it is an absolute certainty
that at this level (combined with the current general price level) the real
exchange rate of Indonesia is “too high”, and that it will come down in the
foreseeable future.  But market participants from abroad are not ready to
move back into the market and massively buy rupiah.  Some fear renewed
political unrest, others just want to move, but only with caution.  Others, still
more cautious, want to avoid commitment while they wait and see.  As a
result the end of the overshoot is not in sight, yet it is hard to blame participants
for acting as they do.
These stories are not meant to give you “the real truth” about overshooting.
They are rather meant to make you more aware of the phenomenon, and to
make you realize how widespread and important it is.  Above all, they are
meant to help you see what a huge research challenge the study of
overshooting can represent, and to stimulate some of you to take up this
challenge.
Appreciating the Importance of Bank Credit
An easy way to introduce this section is to recall a point made earlier,
that a reduction in the demand for money balances, say, in a fixed-exchange-
rate setting, exerts an expansionary force in the economy while the downward
adjustment is being made, and a neutral force once  Ms  and  Md  are again
equal.  Why, then, are large reductions in the demand for money so troubling
to economists and to economic agents generally?  The answer, I think is that
major reductions in the demand for real cash balances usually carry with
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them major reductions in bank credit, particularly credit to the private sector.
Argentina, 1995, was the exception, not the rule.
A reduction in the volume of outstanding credit exerts a depressing force
on effective demand while it is in process.  Once the volume of such credit
has been reduced, its lower level appears to have a negative effect on output.
At least, major real credit crunches are typically associated with declines in
output, and revivals of real credit to the private sector are typically
accompanied by general economic recovery.  The problem is, we really do
not understand the causal mechanism at work in these cases.  Learning more
about how credit really works is an important challenge for future research.
Meanwhile, those who diagnose and prescribe can at least take the precaution
of trying to find ways to forestall a major credit crunch, as the Argentine
authorities did in 1995.
My own thinking about the role of credit has been propped up by the idea
that credit is to the business sector what oil is to a machine — something
that promotes the smooth functioning of the operation.  I am, of course, very
aware that this idea functions as a crutch, enabling me to assign an important
role to private sector credit, even though I do not have a deep understanding
of how it works.  But I am confident that it is better, in this case, to walk with
a crutch than not to walk at all — i.e., it is better to assign an important
(though poorly understood) role to credit than simply to ignore it.
Different paths can and should be followed as we try to learn more about
the role of credit.  Studying the experience of individual firms is a fine place
to start.  We know that some firms operate successfully without credit, so
one line of attack is to try to measure what “price”, if any, they pay for doing
so.  This price would presumably have to do with the fact that equity capital,
at least in normal times, has an economic opportunity cost that is greater
than debt capital.  At the other extreme we can look at the experiences of
firms that have been battered by a credit crunch.  Here one should try to
distinguish between firms that would be non-viable anyway (due to other
causes) and firms that are driven to the wall simply because of very high
interest rates on (or the denial of continued access to) bank credit.
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Another line of investigation is the study of bad and nonperforming loans.
I have the distinct sense that major credit crunches are characterized by a
significant fraction of loans being bad at the beginning of the crunch, with
that fraction growing as the scenario unfolds.  The result, with total credit to
the private sector being progressively squeezed, and bad credit growing at
the same time, is a greatly exaggerated contraction of the amount of funds
available for “good credit”, i.e., credit to healthy, viable firms.  Can we find
ways of identifying bad credits (even ex post), when the banks themselves
do not classify them as bad?
At the macroeconomic level, it does not do much to save the situation
when the Central Bank rescues weak commercial banks by simply exchanging
its good obligations for their bad loans. This will probably stop a run on
those banks by their depositors, but it does nothing at all to change the
consolidated balance sheet of the banking system. The total amount of bank
credit to the private sector remains the same after such an operation, as does
the fraction of this credit occupied by bad loans.  The scarcity of credit for
healthy firms is not alleviated in any way.  When “governments”, as distinct
from Central Banks enter to bail out a weak banking system, they have the
opportunity to “free up” the bank lending capacity that was previously locked
up in bad loans.  But to do this the government must buy that bad paper with
cash.  If all it does is give the Central Bank government bonds in exchange
for the bad paper, then it is these bonds that will take up the lending capacity
freed up by the operation.  So, in order to really do some good, the government
has to use fiscal surpluses (or perhaps new foreign borrowings) for its bailout
operations.  (Financing the bailout by selling government bonds in the
domestic market will probably do no good, as it thus sops up an amount of
funds that just matches the expansion of good credit that the banking system
can undertake on the basis of the bailout.  I believe some very interesting
and useful results would flow from an attempt to examine in these terms
some of the considerable (and growing) number of recent and current
government bailout efforts.
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Quantifying the Social Costs of Unemployment
A good way to start this section is for me to cite a famous remark by
James Tobin – “It takes a heap of Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap.”
In that remark, Tobin was implicitly attributing as a social cost the entire gap
between actual and potential GDP, and by innuendo criticizing the approach
of measuring costs solely in terms of the types of distortions usually
considered in applied welfare economics.  In effect, he was saying that the
distortions approach misses the point, that if fails to capture the lion’s share
of the real costs of a shortfall of output.
Now when I first heard that remark, I issued a verbal challenge to Tobin,
for him to try to express the Okun gap in the language of applied welfare
economics.  I have not seen any such effort, and I think the reason is not hard
to find.  The easy way to at least start down the road to a reply is to assume
the social opportunity cost of labor to be zero, at least when that labor is
being absorbed form the ranks of the unemployed.  Now the issue of zero
opportunity cost has a long history in the literature, and the weight of the
evidence and analysis is very strongly against such an assumption.  My own
one-line comment on this subject is “I’m happy to assign a zero economic
opportunity cost to any workers who are ready to work for a wage of zero;
otherwise I’ll take the voluntary supply price of their labor as my starting
point.”
This answer is certainly the answer of applied welfare economics, in which
demand and supply prices play such a key role.  It is interesting to note that
modern representative-consumer models take a similar tack.  In most of those
models, when there is a change in employment it usually represents a
voluntary movement along the supply curve of labor, with no efficiency cost
being involved.  In such cases, however, we are not dealing with involuntary
unemployment.  One way to simulate that in such models would be  to restrict
the representative consumers, giving them more leisure than they really
wanted.  This would give rise to a triangle of efficiency cost – maybe one of
the Harberger triangles Tobin was referring to.
30LETTER TO A YOUNGER GENERATION
This leads quite naturally to a next step, in which one would assign to
unemployed labor an economic opportunity cost equal to its estimated
voluntary supply price.  This is what I and many others have done, over a
number of decades.  It causes little problem to assign an opportunity cost of,
say, two-thirds or three-fourths of the going market wage, to unemployed
workers who are given employment as a consequence of some project or policy
we are studying.  In addition, of course, one should count any reduction in
unemployment compensation payments that results from the project or policy
in question.  Such payments represent a genuine externality.  Workers who
assume active employment, just at their respective supply prices, are reflecting
a state of indifference between “working at that wage” on the one hand and
“enjoying leisure plus unemployment compensation” on the other.  Thus the
unemployment compensation given up by the workers is part of the
opportunity cost that is being just barely compensated by the wage.  The saving
to taxpayers, however, stemming from not having to pay that compensation,
has not yet been taken into account.  Hence it is a genuine positive externality,
to be assigned to the action of re-employing the unemployed.
The above as if we have the problem sewn up tightly, with no loose ends.
The difficulty comes when we seek evidence on voluntary supply price.  The
great bulk of unemployed workers, when asked what is their supply price, will
state a sum very close to the going wage for their type of labor.  If we follow
this evidence to where it leads, we will end up saying that unemployment
creates no problem (other than the  unemployment  compensation  we pay),
i.e., that the workers are perfectly happy with the tradeoff between work and
leisure, as they see it.  This would be fine, if it were true, but in most cases it
is quite clear that they are not happy with the tradeoff.  An unemployed worker,
Mr. U, has a stated supply price equal to the market wage, of, say $50 per day.
He regularly goes searching for work, and comes home downcast to a
disappointed family as for many weeks running he has had no success.  He
does not, however, lower his stated supply price below $50, as that is indeed
the going market wage for this type of work.  Then, one day, he comes home
reporting that he has indeed found a good job at a wage of $50.
31JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
The whole family is full of joy, and mounts a big celebration.
If this scenario has wide validity, as I think it really does, that means we
are making a mistake in assuming indifference on the part of the workers
between failure and success in their search activities.  How should we really
represent the gain that comes from absorbing unemployed workers.  Right
now, that is a conundrum, but with powerful social and political implications.
It is something that we ought seriously to think about, and hopefully find a
satisfactory answer.
I certainly do not have the answer, but I think I can help you see that the
problem is genuine.  The key is to recognize that the supply price of labor is
not as simple a concept as it appears.  Consider most professors of economics.
If they are located in the United States, they expect to be offered a salary
corresponding to the U.S. market for economics professors.  This is
substantially higher than the U.K. market, but if some of those U.S. professors
end up moving to the U.K. for reasons of family or health, many, probably
most, would be willing to offer their services to the U.K. universities, at a
U.K. wage.  Chilean professors earn still less than those in the U.K., but
again, many U.S., professors, if fate brought them to Chile for reasons other
than a job, would probably willingly offer their services to the Chilean
universities, for work at the going Chilean wage.
So we have at least two different supply curves.  In one of them the
suppliers of labor are inserting themselves in a market where they and
everybody else get the same market wage.  Every point on a market supply
curve is a potential point of market equilibrium.  The individual supply curves
that one sums to get the market supply curve should be built on the same
assumption.  Yet the supply curve along which the unemployed are operating
as they make their choices is one where “everybody else” who is employed
is getting the market wage of that time and place, while they (the unemployed)
offer different supplies of labor at different wage rates,  I prefer not to think
of this type of function as a real supply curve.  Instead, I prefer to think of
Mr. U guessing at the excess demand curve for his type of services, in that
market.  So very likely his stated supply price isn’t even a true supply price.
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Maybe he is better thought of as playing a game of search, in which the
reward is a permanent or semi-permanent job at the market wage – a reward
which he gets on that one lucky day when he finds a job — and the return on
the losing days consists of the value of leisure (probably related to some
relevant ordinate on his “true” supply curve) minus the disutility of whatever
search activity he undertakes.
The above simply takes a stab at what a final answer to the conundrum of
the social opportunity cost of unemployed labor might look like.  I hope this
gives you enough to see that it is a genuine intellectual challenge.  In addition,
of course, it is a matter of serious importance in the real world.  People laugh
at us when we impute to the involuntarily unemployed a benefit from leisure
equal to the market wage (in cases where they are receiving no unemployment
compensation).  Yet that is where certain traditional paths have led us.  How
can we come up with an appropriate diagnosis of the severity of the problem
if we have no real clue as to its cost?  And how can we give sensible
prescriptions for relieving the problem, if we operate out of such a state of
ignorance?  So, I submit, it is a real challenge to us, both as economic analysts
and as “country doctors”.
VI. Concluding Observations
I realize that the format of “a letter to a younger generation” is far from
the typical conference contribution.  But I hope that listeners and readers
will understand that it is motivated by the special ties that bind me to CEMA,
to its founders, to its professors and its students.  And it is also motivated by
my love for the science, the discipline, the profession and the practice of
economics, and by my great desire to see all of these thriving and flourishing
together in the coming decades.  I hope, then, that you will find in these
rambling comments about many subjects some sense of where we as a
profession have come from, of where we are and of where we might fruitfully
go, that will help you make your own contributions to the fulfillment of my
great wish.
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